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-2 -successful takeovers is recognized (cf. Scherer, p. 76) , these are exceptions among a below-the-average major ity . In hostile takeovers, a majority of the acquired firms are only mild underperformers, claimed not to justify the high costs and other disturbing effects which such takeovers imply.
The theoretical criticism falls into two categories. The first assumes that capital markets are efficient, so that the market for corporate controI is superfluous. If manageriaI performance is perfectly signalled by the value of stocks, and if the demand side on the market for managers consists of perfectly optimizing owners or boards of directors, efficiency in management of firms can indeed be achieved without any change in ultimate control. The see ond theoretical criticism claims on the contrary that the stock market is inefficient, which allows takeovers to be based on incorrect stock values, thus causing the market for corporate controI to be socially harmful.
The present argument opposes all of those criticisms. On the empirical side, the findings of the market's critics will be acknowledged, but shown of little relevance. In the evolutionary perspective of this paper. the few exceptional successes are substantially more important than the below-theaverage major ity , and, moreover, the average itself depends on the presence or the absence of the market.
On the theoretical side, stock market inefficiency will be admitted, but not as evidence against the market for corporate control. It will on the contrary prov ide a major reason why social efficiency is better served with this market than without it. The market for managers together with the stock market as a signalling device are important, but insufficient to deal with an important social allocation problem, especially when their own efficiency is uncertain.
-3 -The extension of Alchian's and Winter's evolutionary ana lyses is from product markets to markets for managers, capita l , and corporate control.
Moreover, non-market alternatives will also be considered -such as industrial policy or large-scale planning -to allow for comparative reasoning. The pur pose is to avoid what Demsetz (1969) calls 'nirvana fallacy' -that is, not to condemn a wasteful market if all its alternatives are even more wasteful. As no evolution can do without significant was te , to avoid this fallacy is even more important in evolutionary analysis than in the standard static one.') A qualification of the present argument is in order. It is not necessarily the current form of the market for corporate control, nor the current game of mergers and takeovers, that I defend. I only argue that ~ market and ~ game of this kind are necessary for efficient allocation of scarce resources in society. Admitting that a specific form of this market, like that of any other market, may suffer from serious failures, my argument is that policy should try to enhance this market by suitable institutionaI rules -e.g" along the lines mentioned by Shleifer and Vishny (1988) -and not hinder it, submit it to detailed case-to-case control, or eliminate it altoghether.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 defines economic competence (BC) and summarizes its most important properties. Section 2 draws a picture of a general economic organization. Section 3 considers BC as a propert y of both individuals and organizations and examines the relationship between the two. A qualitative model of BC-allocation is outlined in section 4, and its evolutionary nature exposed in section 5. Based on this model, section 6 explains why the market for corporate controI is necessary for social efficiency.
-4 -l Economic competence All agents, to be able to receive and use information, need some preexisting information telling them how to do so. While some of this information may consist of instructions received in the past, much of it must initially res ide with each agent, so that the first instructions can be understood, and the multi-stage process of receiving and using information can thus be started. To think of a computer which must initially be endowed with much information in its hardware to be able to receive programs and use data may be instructive. It is such agent-specific ("hardware") information that is referred to here by the term competence.
For economic analys is , a particularly important kind of competence is economic competence, defined as the competence to receive and use information for solving economic problems and taking economic decisions.
EG thus refers to what is of ten called "optimization abilities" or "rationali ty" . Three of i ts properties should be noted.
First, EG is an unusyal ~ ci economic information. The economic information usually studied -such as data about prices, quantities, or qualities of goads -can be communicated, possibly at a cost, from one agent to another. In contrast, EG is a kind of information capita l , inseparably tied to each economic agent, on which the veryabilities of agents to communicate and use all other economic information repose, but which cannot be directly communicated itself. It is thus :ta.c.i:t. in the sense of Polanyi (1962) . It is also difficult :t.c. obserye a.n.d. measure, even by its owners themselves, as the frequent cases of overestimation or underestimation of one's own competence amply illustrate.
)
Although EG cannot be acquired by direct communication, an agent may increase its stock by learning, possibly under the guidance of a teacher.
But learning requires some pre-existing competence as weIl. To be able to -5 - learn, an agent must initially be endowed with a sophisticated piece of information in the form of a learning method, or, to include the interesting case of learning to learn studied by Stiglitz (1987) , an even more sophisticated method for learning learning methods. All that an agent can potentially learn in an ideal learning environment is constrained by such initially given learning (or meta-learning) competence ("talents").
Formal ly , the competence to learn more EC will also be counted as EC.
It need not be exclusively specialized in learning only EC, but may in part correspond to general intelligence, allowing for learning other kinds of competence as weIl. Significant specialization seems nevertheless to take place. As the talents to become a top musician, a great chess master, a tennis champion, or a top mathematician do not seem to be highly correlated among themselves, there is no reason to expect that the talents for organizing and managing business operations and being rational in complex economlc decisions are highly correlated with other talents either.
The recent ly developed theories of transaction costs, governance structures, principal-agent relationships, implicit contracts, optimal search, and jOb-assignment are, in fact, trying to identify and communicate some of the BC required for successful organizing and managing of firms.
But there is a substantiaI gap between these theories and the relevant EC.
Although mastering these theories may help economists understand what goes on in the business world, this mastering is neither sufficient, nor necessary for becoming an excellent organizer, manager, or investor.
The second important propert y of BC is to be a determinant o! economie behavior -meaning that EC is embodied in the very ways economic decisions are made. In other words, if these ways are expressed as decision functions, it is in these functions that EC is embodied.
-6 -An important implication is that the neoclassical optimization postulate must be dropped -at least in its strong variant used in neoclassical welfare economics and neoclassical analys is of economic organizations. Instead, drawing on the ideas of Simon (1955 Simon ( , 1978 and Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , a variant of bounded rationality must be admitted.
The reas on why the optimization postulate must be dropped is worth noting. With this postulate, the only determinants of agents' behaviors can be their objective functions (or sets of preferences), which are assumed always to be maximized. To admit that also BC determines economic behavior means to admit that agents may also differ in their abilities to pursue objectives. Two agents with the same objective function in the same situation may thus take systematically different decisions, if endowed with different BC. This propert y exposes the important passibility that even the most disciplined agent, motivated by optimal incentives, may become a source of important sociallosses, if his BC is inadequate to the decision task to which he is assigned.
3 )
The third important propert y of EC is to be a scarce resource, whose allocatian may be crucial for the efficiency of economic organizations, including entire economies. It is this propert y that makes EC different from bounded rationality. The latter is seen by bot h Simon and Williamson to be a general phenomenon which affects all agents in about the same way.
In contrast, EC is an agent-specific resource, whose stocks may differ from one agent to another, implying that the rationality of different agents may be bounded in different ways and degrees.
Rather than maximizing EC for each decisian task, the basic principle of efficient EC-allocation is to match the BC of agents with the kind and the difficulty of the decisian tasks they have to perform. The term 'competence-difficulty gaps' due to Heiner (1983) is a good way to express -7 -this situation. Clearly, it is such gaps, and more precisely the losses they imply, that should be minimized: highly difficult decision tasks of great impact on finaloutcomes should be assigned only to highly competent agents and, symmetrically. decision tasks should not be made more difficult than the agents available can handle without excessively costly errors.
If the EC of different agents suits decision tasks of different kinds and difficulties, it is a heterogenous resource. In spite of this complication, its allocation may at first seem easy to handle by standard economic analysis extended to include economic information and human capital. What makes the problem of EC-allocation look so easy is that EC seems to be a simple combination of the two: it is a kind of economic information and its most unpleasant properties -to be heterogenous, impossible to communicate, and difficult to observe and measure -are the same as those of human capital. Yet a closer examination reveals that the combination is far from simple. The stumbling-block is that each of the two has been studied precisely under the assumption that it does nc1 have an essentiaI propert y of the other: the economic information studied must be communicable, whereas human capita l may concern all possible skills, but not those of economic decision-making.
Why neoclassical theory of human capital cannot deal with these skills is instructive to note. To recall, this theory is about investment in costly education, by which a person, postulated to be a perfect economic optimizer, is to improve her skills, thereby increasing her value ~ factor of production. The important, but rarely not ed point is that if these skills were to be of the EC kind, needed for optimal investing itself, the optimization postulate would be contradicted and a paradox would result.
To see this, imagine a poorly competent investor who is to optimize his investment in studies of the economics of investment. His problem is on a -8 -par with Catch 22: he cannot optimize, with all the necessary data about the casts and the future benefits of such studies available, before having invested much -and passibly too much! -in them. 4 ) What conatitutea an even more serious paradox for neoclassical analysis is the problem of EG-allocation involving several economic agents. The second and third properties of EG -to be a determinant of economic behavior and a scarce resource -are mutually incompatible within the neoclassical framework. They imply that EG is an element of the economic calculus by which scarce resources are allocated, and at the same time one of the resources which are being allocated. In other words, it is by means of EG that EG is allocated. EG is thus to play two roles which the axiomatic building of neoclassical welfare economics needs to keep separated -to be a tool as weIl as an object of the social allocation process. The resource-allocation mechanism which runs this process can thus no longer be seen as an imperturbable device, elevated above the problem of scarcity, but its own parts must now be recognized as possibly scarce. Much like an organism rather than mechanism, it must then also assume the task of allocating these parts, and thus keep building and rebuilding itself.
All of this is central to the point at issue. Gonsider the argument that the market for managers, together with learning (adaptation) with in firms, suffices to prov ide for competently managed firms, thus making the market for corporate controi superfluous. To be sure, these are two important ways to improve the EG of the management of firms, but they cannot solve this problem ent1rely, uniess certain other EG has already been eff1c1ently allocated. In part, this 1s the BG of the actual managers, includ1ng their learn1ng potential, by which all learning with1n firms can strong ly be constra1ned. And 1n part this is the EG of the buyers on the -9 -market for managers -owners in person, or represented by board of directors -by which the efficiency of this market stands or falls.
An important part of the EC-allocation problem thus remains unsolvedthe one of efficient allocatian of EC to the board of directors, and ultimately to the owners. That also the ownership of firms calls for allpcation of adequate EC is a key part of the present argument. If the society contained potential owners of more suitable EC than the actual ones, social efficiency would require a reallocation of the ownership of firms from the latter to the former. The obvious reas on is that these are likely to choose more campetent board of directors, who are likely to appoint more campetent managers, who in turn are likely to enable the firms to adapt better to whatever social and private demands there are to be met.
A major difficulty with EC-allocation is that it seams to lead to an infinite regress. The problem of how to allocate suitable EC to the ownership of firms raises the problem of which EC should guide this allocatian. Should it be the EC of same superowners, shopping on a market for owners? Or should it rather be the EC of government, appointing the boards of directors or, more directly, the managers? Whatever the answer, the problem of which EC should guide the allocatian of this EC would immediately arise, and so on.
Neoclassical analysis is saved from this paradox by the optimization postulate. This postulate assumes, in essence. that at least same of the EC involved is abundant, thus fixing an artificial but convenient starting point from which the rest of resource allocatian can straightforwardly unfold. Xost of ten , it is the EC of the managers which is implicitly assumed abundant. Provided their incentives are right, the managers are assumed to hire the best labor available, solve optimally the problems of job design and assignment. and in general maximize the firm's profits. If, -10 -as some recent theories do, this BC is recognized as scarce, by admitting that different managers may be of different talents, then it is the BC of the owners who shop on the market for managers, and of the investors who trade on the stock market that is assumed abundant. Now the question is: "How can we understand the social allocation problem, if no onets BC is above suspicion?" 2 General economic organizations
The first prerequisite for an answer is a clear picture of an economic organization. For the present purposes, the following one seems to be the simplest.
Consider an economic organization -e.g., a firm, a government agency, or an entire economy -coordinating the activities of a set of economic agents. The agents can be individuals, or smaller organizations. In the latter case, the same picture can be made, mutat is mutandis, of each such agent.
Both agents and organizations are characterized by their economic behavior -e.g., as described by a decision (or response) function. To recall, such behavior has been assumed to have two determinants: (1) the set of preferences (objective function) which the agent or the organization pursues, or can be assumed to pursuej and (2) the BC with which this pursuit is conducted.
An organization is moreover characterized by three other terms:
'arrangement' • 'structure' , and 'regime'. As all of them have been used in man y different ways, care is necessary in specifying what they mean here.
'Arrangement' is defined as the set of economic decision tasks within an organization, and the ways in which they are linked tagether. Examples are a market, with decision tasks for buyers and sel lers , and possibly also -11 -an auctloneer, or a <plannlng) hierarchy, with decision tasks for a manager <planner) and a number of subordinate producers and consumers.
'Structure' <S) is defined as the arrangement aw1 the agents which actually assume the tasks, together. Since lt ls the agents' behaviors, as coordinated by the arrangement, that produce the global behavior of the organization, this definition makes true the proposition that structure determines behayior aw1 performace.
S thus corresponds to what is of ten called 'resource-allocation mechanism'.
As the term 'structure' has of ten been used for what is called here 'arrangement'. while what is called here 'structure' has of ten been identified with the organization itself, it is important to realize the differences. In the present terminology, 'structure' is 'arrangement plus agents l, and an organization is something more stab le than a structure. An organization must be able to change its structure -e.g., by exit or entry of agents, or by changes in its arrangement -without losing its identity.
Clearly, one could not study the evolution of structures in organizations, if the two were defined to mean the same thing.
Adapting a definition by Hurw1cz (1971>, the 'regime' (R) of an organization is interpreted as the set of its institutional rules which constrain the behavior of its agents, much like the rules of a game constrain the behavior of its players. Examples of such rules are propert y rights, signalling rules, labor law, corporation law, and antitrust law.
Note that regimes can be used to characterize different types of economies. For example, a capitaiist economy can be characterized by an R which allows for private ownership of capital, transferrable through capital markets. In contrast, all definitions of socialism imply 1nstitutional rules that prohibit, or at least significantly limit, this kind of ownership and market, even if labor and product markets may be allowed.
-12 -As long as structures are constant, not much attention need be paid to regimes. Since for each agent, the institutionai rules to be respected are implicit in his decision task, and since the decision tasks within an organization are determined by its arrangement, the arrangement and the structure thus automatically include the prevailing R. For instance, this can be seen as the reas on why neoclassical analysis usually describes a capitaiist economy as a set of markets I and a socialist economy as a hierarchy of planning -that is, refers to their respective arrangementswhile leaving only implicit the propert y rights and signalling rules of the corresponding regimes.
It is when changes of arrangements and structures are to be studied that regimes become important. Since what varies can be studied only with reference to something else which does not, the first question is, then, what invariant can characterize an organization instead of the now variable S. As S can of ten evolve while the prevailing institutionai rules remain the same, R is the natural condidate for this role -at least untill its own evolution is to be studied. One may think of the rules of a game which may remain the same, while players may en ter or exit, form or dissolve coalitions, or otherwise change their roles and mutual relations within the game. What makes R particularly important is that it is largely responsible for how the S under its rules will evolve7)
In the present argument it is the R of the economy considered that will be of particular importance. The central question can now be formulated as follows: "Is it necessary, for an economy to be efficient, that its R allows for the market for corporate control?"
3 The economic competence of organizations Kuch like other scarce resources, EG can belong to individuals and to -13 -organizations. But whereas the holding of an organization in other resources can usually be counted as a simple sum of the holdings of its members, for EC the relationship between the two is more complex.
As EC corresponds to the abilities to pursue objectives, the EC of an organization corresponds to what is usually called 'efficiency' -such as the allocative efficiency of an economy, meaning the economy's abilities to maximize a Pareto welfare function, or the x-efficiency of a firm, meaning the firm's abilities to maximize profits. As the EC of an individual was noted to correspond to 'rationality', rationality and efficiency are thus provided with an important common denominator -to be equivalent to the EC of their respective owners. The question of how the EC of organizations depends on the EC of their members is then the question of ~ organizational efficiency depends on indiyidual rationality.
As noted in section l, EC is a determinant of economic behavior, which, for an organization, is also determined by the organization's structure, as
follows from the present definition of S. Thus, the EC Of an organization is embodied in its S. But S consists of a set of member-agents and the arrangement which determines and interconnects their decision tasks. This means that the EC of an organization may come from two sources: the individual EC of the agents, and the arrangement. If the agents with their EC are given, it is by arranging them into a cgrtain structure that the EC of the organization is prQduced.
The analogy with computer hardware may again be helpful. Kuch like the hardware embodies the competence of an computer to use software, the structure embodies the competence of an organization to use other economic information and take economic decisionsj and much like the hardware must be produced by wiring together components of certain functional abilities, the structure must be produced by arranging agents of certain individual EC.
-14 -Of course, there are also important differences. One appears when we ask ~ does the arranging or wiring: whereas the wiring of a computer must be done by an exogenous constructor, most of the arranging of an economic organization must be done endogenously by the member-agents themselves. But regardless of how the result is obtained, the fact that it dependens on both the agents ("components") and their arrangement ("wiring") remains.
S > This means that allocation of BC can be anatomized into the same basic processes by which structures form and reform, which may be described as designing, assigning. aw1 interconnecting er economic decision ~.
Evolutionary economics aside, the nearest relatives of the present problem in the literature are the job-assignment problem surveyed and elaborated by Waldman (1984) and the problem of self-perpetuation of organizations briefly outlined by Stiglitz (1984) .9) Jeither, however, embraces the problem of EC-allocation in its entirety, and it is instructive to note why.
The job-assignment problem has been studied under the assumption that all jobs have already been designed and interconnected -that is, that the organization's arrangement is ~ priori given -leaving open only the question of their assignment to specific agents. Koreover, the key job of assign1ng all the other jobs is assumed already assigned, and to a perfectly competent optimizer on the top af everything else -thus violating the present requ1rement that no one's BC be above susp1cion.
The self-perpetuation problem 1s limited to agents choosing their successors for the same decision tasks within an organization. Here, in -17 -contrast, the tasks need not remain the same, but may als o be created, modified, or abol1shed. Koreover, agents mayenter, exit, or move among the tasks, in quite a general manner. The present problem is thus not only that of how organizations self-perpetuate, but also that of how they selforganize and evolve.
O)
A more useful reference is the problem studied by Lucas (1978) .
Assuming that managerial talents are scarce and unequally distributed, and that the output of a firm depends on its size and on the talent of its manager, the problem is to find the optimum number and size distribution of firms which maximize the total output, given the distribution of managerial talents in society. This is a clearly stated special case of the present problem: how to organize an optimal structure of prQduction, given the distribution of indiyidual EC in society.
It is convenient indeed to limit the problem of EC-allocation to production. Its study can then be relatively value-free, largely avoiding the thorny issues of consumer sovereignty and social va lues in general.
Whatever individual and social values there might be, and whatever private and social final demands they might imply, misallocation of EC within production -such as management of firms assigned to persons of poor managerial talents -is always sceially wasteful.
In contrast to Lucas, the fceus is here not on what an optimal structure of production is, but on the process by which such a structure would form and evolve -that is, by which firms of suitable sizes would be formed, and the managers of suitable talents would be found, selected, and matched with appropriate firms. Clearly, such a process calls for decisions and actions also of other kinds of agents than managers -such as directors and owners -for which other kinds of EC may be demandedsuch as the EC to assess the managers' EC. Consequently, the S considered -18 -here must be more complex than the one considered by Lucas, which already is more complex than the usually studied one-level structures. Without saying is explicitly, Lucas considers ~ leveis, containing markets for labor, physical capita 1 , and products ~ firms, and simple "one managerhomogenous labor" hierarchies within firms.
Here, in addition, the intaL-firm level must involve markets for managers, financial capital, and controi over firms. Xoreover, to allow for comparative reasoning, their non-market supplements or alternatives must To be sure, associative actions are also subject to the familiar resource constraints and guided by the familiar preferences over eventual allocative outcomes. But the influence of associative constraints and preferences may sometimes prevail, and thus constitute another important reason than inadequate individual BC, for which a firm or en entire economy mayevolve an economically incompetent, i.e. allocatively inefficient, S.
Comparative eyolutipnary economics
An important implication of the previous sect10n is that BC-allocation must -21 -be conducted. by muns of changes of S, which makes it eqyivalent to Sevolytion. To understand the meaning of this equivalence, recall the difference between EC and other economic information. As opposed. to the lat ter , which can be communicated. from one part of S to another, EC, which is by definition tacit, and thus bound to structures and their parts, can be allocated. only by moving and rearranging the parts themselves.
To see the evolutionary role of the market for corporate control, it is now necessary to clarify how S-evolution is influenced. by the prevailing R, and what difference it makes whether the R allows for that market or not.
In the above picture of EC-allocation, the influence of R falls into two parts. During A-periods, the influence is indirect, m. the regime's rules governing the traditional resource-allocation -such as legal conditions of signalling and trade on exist1ng product markets, or with in existing hierarchies -the results of which determine, for the following B-periods, which changes of S become economically feasible. During B-periods, the influence is direct, m. those rules that are specialized. in govern1ng
associative actions -such as legal conditions of entry, exit, takeovers, and organizational and personal changes within firms and agencies -which determine which of the economically feasible changes are also institutionally permissible.
With the exception of Commons (1929) , economic theory has left the influence of R on S-evolution largely unexplored., although Alchian (1950) and Winter (1971) can be said to study a special case of it. In the present terms, what they do is to study the S of a product market under a standard capitalist R. Initially, the S contains a set of firms with different EC for profit-maximizing. Their main question 1s, whether or not market selection will eliminate the firms with inadequate EC, and thus make -22 -the S evolve towards a state where only the EC capable of profit-maximizing is allocated to the controi over production.
To generalize this case, consider the well-known flaws of product market selection: to be slow and castly, by requiring too many trials of which mast will become failures, and by allowing a large firm to lose much of its previous EC and yet survive for a long time, while a small firm of much higher EC may be eliminated by pure accident. A seemingly easy remedy is to accelerate the elimination of eventual lasers and to support the future winners by providing them with more financial capital. Upon a claser view, however, this remedy proves far from easy. The reason is that it requires mu ch of suitable EC -the one for early recognition of future profit-maximizers -if the product market selection is to be made faster and cheaper, rather than even slower and castlier. That also this EC is scarce has been amply illustrated by the recent experience with industrial policy, when many governments intended to pick and support winners, while more of ten than not they bailed out lasers instead.
)
And private capital owners do not always succeed at this task, either. Of those who try only some do, while others lose large sums or go bankrupt. The general problem of EC-allocation and the corresponding S-evolution must thus concern also other kinds of EC than that for profit-maximizing in production.
To state this problem, consider a given society as a collection of individuals endowed with different EC. The central question is: Under what R wpuld they mpst likely eyplve an efficignt S pf prQductipn, which wpuld allpw them tp make an efficient use pf all their scarce respurces, including their scarce EC. for meeting their final indiyidual and cpllectiye demands, whatever these might be? In contrast to Lucas (1978) and Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , who regard the S of production as an exogenous variable, trying to determine its optimal state themselves, S is here an endogenous variable, to -23 -be formed and provided with the best attainable EC during an endogenous evolutionary process. It is this process, and the influence that the prevailing R exerts on it, that is here in focus.
According to the present argument, an efficient S of production cannot even be determined by theory. Although the usually considered technological factors and transaction costs remain important, they do not suffice to determine an efficient S. This also depends on the available EC, which, because of its tacitness, no theory can fully take into consideration. For example, it is weIl known that transactions costs are difficult to measure with enough precision, and arrangements which save on them are difficult to design in all relevant details. Xuch will therefore depend on the EC at work, with which the general principles of transaction costs economics will be used in particular circumstance -e.g., in recognizing and avoiding oversized firms and exaggerated centralization, in designing effective contracts, and -per ha ps ab ove all -in assigning the most important tasks to persons with the most suitable EC, or at least in keeping these tasks away from persons with inadequate EC. The presenee or absence of a few exceptionally talented entrepreneurs, which cannot a priori be measured, can thus be decisive for how concentrated an efficient S should be.
lt would be convenient to have a kind of efficiency for assessing different Ris, analogous to allocative (Pareto) efficiency used for assessing different S's. In a slightly different context, Karris and Kueller (1980) speak of "adaptive efficiency", and Eliasson (1985) of "Schumpeter efficiency". As the former term sounds too passive, as if S should only adapt to exogenous changes, I opt for the latter, redefining it within the present R-S framework in Pelikan (1988) . Roughly, an R is said to be Schumpeter efficient, if it can guide S-evolution towards the allocatively "least inefficienct" S, under the constraint of the available individual EC. 13 )
The present argument opposes both these answers, suggesting a third one. The first answer is opposed for the simple empirical reason that successful large-scale planning ~ exist in large capitaIist firms, some even larger and not much less diversified than some small socialist economies. These firms are thus the living proofs that -whether neoclassical theory is right or wrong -all the informational and motivationai obstacles can reasonably be overcome in practice, and that even a very large centrally planned organization can be made reasonably efficient.
The second answer is opposed because it reposes on the optimization postulate, thus limiting the issue to the allocation of all other scarce resources, but not EC. Indeed, the suggested planning arrangements can be efficient only if the EC of all firms and the Planning Agency is her01cally assumed abundant. That 1s, these firms and agencies must be ab le to optimize in all the tasks, however soph1st1cated, which such an arrangement -25 -mayassign to them. This means, among other things, that all firms must be of the right sizes, efficiently organized, and competently managed. In contrast, the present argument points out, corroborated by ample empirical evidence from the USSR and Eastern Europe, that it is precisely the scarcity of such firms that may be the decisive obstacle to the success of ~ socialist economic reform.
14 )
The difficulties of large-scale planning with EC-allocation stem from the fact that no onets EC is above suspicion. This prevents EC from becoming the subject of any a priori estabilshed optimal planning. Instead, the allocation problem must include the fundamental questions of who is to manage, and who is to plan. Any initially established planning S is likely to be far from embodying an efficient allocation of EC in the design of its tasks as weIl as in their assignment to specific individuals. The economy may contain more talented managers and/or planners than some of the initially appointed ones. Some firms may be wrongly dimensioned and/or wrongly organized. Social efficiency then requires an allocation process by which the more talented individuals can replace the less talented ones, and the errors in the sizes and structures of firms can be corrected. And if one were tempted to think of some "superplanners" to plan this process, their EC would also have to be put in question, and the design as weIl as the assignment of their tasks again included in the allocation problem.
The third answer thus emerges. Efficienct large-scale planning can exist, but only if conducted with adequate EC. As this EC is scarce -the larger the scale of planning, the scarcer the EC becomes -and, as it is by definition tacit and difficult to measure, scarce EC is also needed to measure and allocate this EC. Hence, efficient large-scale planning can exist, but cannot be obtained by large=scale planning. Whateyer large-scale planning may be needed in an optimal S of prgduction, it can be obtained -26 -only through an evolution with mauy trials, where markets must have the last word.
Successful large firms, which are so easily taken for granted in a static view of advanced capitaIist economies, must thus be regarded as rare successes of a broad evolutionary process, where they constitute only a tiny visible minor ity among all the unsuccessful and no longer visible trials. loisy and costly experimentation is the only means to insure that large-scale planning will evolve the BC adequate for its scale, or adjust its scale to the BC available. Without many trials, such planning would unlikely be found, and without the selective pressure of competitive markets, it would likely grow inefficient. It is, then, the much lower variety of trials and the absence of market selection that constitute the main reason why large-scale planning is so unlikely to succeed in politicoadministratively formed government agencies -in spite of its empirically documented success in market-evolved, possibly even larger capitaIist firms. This is, however, not to exclude large-scale planning from also actively contributing to an efficient S-evolution. Many large efficient firms may also become efficient in planning their further expansion or reorganization.
The point is, however, that such efficient planning can emerge only gradually, as a result of exceptionally successful trials, at a later stage of S-evolution. It cannot be assumed to exist from the beginning, nor trusted to the end. lo planning is above suspicion of itself being. or becoming, a costly organizational error which should be dissolved into a set of markets, or replaced by a different planning, conducted by different persons. Inefficient planning which is allowed to survive and plan its further expansion is a particularly harmful case of a cumulative, pathdependent evolutionary process, which may cause the entire structure of production to evolve towards increasing inefficiency.
-27 -6 Evolutionary reasons fpr the market for corporate controI
That organizational trials and errors as weIl as competitive markets are needed for efficient S-evolution gives a rough but useful clue as to what R may minimize Schumpeterian failures. Such R should not prevent promising trials, nor perpetuate committed errors (cf. Pelikan 1985 Pelikan , 1988 ). AIso, it should allowall the needed markets to form, develop, and preserve a minimum degree of competitiveness. low the remaining question is whether the needed markets include the mattet fpr corporate control.
As the BG embodied in the S of production can sometimes be improved by having some firms merge into larger units, or divide into smaller ones, or have their ultimate controI transferred to other owners, social efficiency requires some institutionally defined means to allow for such changes. And if no one's BG is above suspicion, then no a priori appointed planners, nor the incumbent managers, directors, or capital owners can be expected always to have the most suitable BG for deciding on such changes. Gonsequently, by simple elimination, a competitive market for the ultimate controI over firms appears to be the only alternative.
Another interpretation of the empirical evidence submitted by the market's critics thus emerges. From the present evolutionary perspective, neither costly errors nor poor statistical averages need be of much significance. Thinking of the vast major ity of unsuccessful mutations, it is difficult to imagine a noisier and more wasteful process than biological evolution, and yet this may be the only way to increasingly complex forms of life. The noise and waste of an evolutionary process may weIl be the necessary price to pay for the formation of increasingly competent economic structures as weIl. In the long runt the losses caused by the majority of erroneous trials may be more than outweighed by the gains of slowly accumulatlng exceptional successes -provlded the errors are prompt ly -28 -eliminated and the successes preserved. Ultimately, an optimal 8 will be constituted only of such exceptional and thus ~ priori unlikely successes.
Of course, the question of how prompt the elimination of errors should be is a delicate one. While it may be felt that the average of 10 years needed to redress or close a mismanaged U.8. firm is too high (cf. Scherer), if comparison were made with non-capitalist economies -where the corresponding delays must be measured in decades, if not centuries -this average must be considered satisfactory.
Recall also the evidence that in the long run, most of the firms involved in takeovers are below the industry's average in profitability as weIl as in the growth of the value of shares. In addition to the limited relevance of failed trials, even if they are in majority. there is another reason why this is no evidence against the market for corporate control.
The average itself depends on the presence or absence of the market. If there is a race, everyone will run faster, and thus raise the average speed, in comparison with a quiet walk without racing. Relevant evidence could be obtained only by comparing the effects of the possibility of takeoyers on all firms, be they actually involved in a takeover or not, and make a comparison with the firms in an initial ly similar economy where takeovers have been prohibited.
The impossibility to measure EC directly and reliably, which Xarris and Xueller (1980) use as the reason to dismiss the entire competenee argument, is here an important evidence for it. If such measuring were possible, neoclassical optimal planning could also be used for EC-allocation. What makes competitive markets irreplaceable is precisely the fact that EC can be measured only indirectly, by means of competition comparing its eventual performance in the relevant field, or subjectively, by guesses of some other EC -such as the EC of capita l owners. But then another competitive market -29 --such as a capital market -is again necessary, to compare the performance of that Ee in the field of relevant guessing.
To see why, consider how the competence for playing a game can be measured. Good subjective guesses require much competence for judging both the game and the players; more objective results can only be obtained from tournaments in ~ game. If the relevant field is the controI over firms, the tournament can hardly be anything else than a competitive market for this control. To expect the best relevant Ee to be found by the politicoadministrative competition within government would be like expecting tennis tournaments to find out the best chess players (or vice versa).
To test the present argument, consider the following objections to the market for corporate control: (1) poorly managed firms can be improved by better incentives for incumbent managers, in particular by allowing them to own larger amounts of sharesj (2) the incumbent managers may have to be replaced, but the market for managers, and the stock market as an indicator of manageriai performance, suffice to solve the problem; (3) far from being efficient, the stock market may err no less than the managers, causing the market for corporate controi to err as weIl (cf. Scherer).
The suggested answers are as follows. (1) another kind of Ee which may be just as scarcej many incompetent persons seem also to lack the competence to know how incompetent they are.
(2) To serve as an indicator of managers' performance and to allow shareholders to vote with their feet are two important functions of the to change the allocation of EC to the controI over production requires to start a different firm with different managers, directors, and owners.
Clearly, as a way of improving EC-allocation, such a complete-bankrupcynew-start method is extreme ly slow and costly. And although it may sometimes be useful as a last resort, trading in controlover still viable firms is of ten a faster and socially cheaper alternative.
In contrast to Scherer's views, the takeovers of on ly mild underperformers can thus be a sign of Schumpeterian efficiency: to respond to small deviations usually provides for smoother and cheaper adjustments than to wait for large deviations j moreover, this also suggests that high BC which can recognize and respond to such small deviations is already at work on the market for corporate control -even if theoretical economists may not always fully appreciate its contents and significance.
(3) As no one's BC is here above suspicion, it is of course admitted that capital owners trading on the stock market may lack adequate BC. and thus cause this market to be inefficient. But this is precisely an important reason why the market for corporate control should be defended.
That standard analys is may arrive at the opposite conlusion is due to its simplified view of the social role of markets. It views a market only as a -31 -given allocatian device which is to allocate scarce resources by means of given Be. If this BC is inadequate, the market is inefficient and its social value is put in doubt. Here, in contrast, a market is above all an evolutionary device which is to improve the EC for the allocatian of other scarce resources.
The market for corporate controi would indeed be superfluous if only managers, but not owners, had inadequate EC. In that case, no changes in the ultimate controi over firms would ever be needed, and the market for managers, tagether with the stock market as a pure indicator of managers' performance, would suffice. Because this is not the case, the market for corporate controi is irreplaceable. The feat of this market is to connect two crucial kinds of EC-allocation into one closed circle by providing for a double selection of both managers and owners. This is indeed the only known way for EC-allocation to be saved from infinite regress, if no one's Ee is above suspicion: it is the capital owners who more or less directly select the managers, and it is the performance of the selected managers by which the owners stand or fall.
As an example, consider the of ten discussed problem of short-sighted managers. While such managers may ex ist , succeed for a while, and cause serious social losses, they must now be considered jointly with the capital owners who appoint them and/or invest in them. If correctly formulated final demands provide the ultimate criteria for judging the abilities of producers <and if not, the fault is not with the market for corporate control!), the firms under such managers must in the long run decrease in value, thus undermining the position of their owners as weIl. And while such unions of short-sighted managers and owners might also be demoted by pure product market selection, without the market for corporate control, this would take even more time and requtre the sacrifice of entire firms.
-32 -A great merit of the market for corporate control is that short-sighted managers and owners may be forced to go while their firms may still be saved. Although the process may still be unpleasantly slow and noisy, if no deus ex machina can be called upon -and, as shown above, government is among the least promising candidates for this role -the problem of shortsightedness in the organization and management of prQduction has no superior solution.
Finally, the present argument should also be tested yis-a-yis the Although this failure may be serious, it should not be overestimated.
Af ter all, it is also quite possible that some raiders might be better learners than the incumbent managers, who might not be about to succeed.
but only say so. In general, the task of distinguishing true good learners from eloquent poor learners requires much of relevant EC, which again -33 -cannot be efficiently allocated without same evolutionary process invalving bath selection and learning. Of course, this is precisely the kind af EC in which the capital owners should excell, in order ta be able ta recognize, appoint, and/ar 1nvest in the managers who are the true good learners. But as no one is guaranteed ta have enough af this EC either, no known alternative 1s superiar ta the double selection by the market far corporate control.
The other Schumpeterian failure I wish ta consider is excessiye growth af firms. In the question af how large a f1rm should be allowed ta grow, evolut1onary reasaning can discover a delicate trade-off between economies af scale and conditions af evolution. This mitigates the modern "haspitable" view -as advocated in particular by Williamsan (1975) and Baumol et al. (1982) -that even a very large firm can be socially efficient. Ta be sure, this view has also been advocated here, but with the important qualification that the firm must also passess sufficiently high EC. It is as the means ta find and keep such high EC that an evolutionary process, providing far many trials and strict elimination af errors, has been found necessary. The trade-off stems fram the fact that the presence af incrasingly large firms is likely ta damage this process. As they are likely ta dampen new trials and make the process lenient ta their own errors, their efficiency becomes increasingly unlikely.
Even if difficult ta determine with any precision, it is possible ta assume an optimal trade-off between the economies af scale which an efficient large firm can realize -provided it is and remains efficient! -and the damages ta S-evolution which it is likely ta cause. The question is then, how ta shape the market far corporate control, in order ta prevent firms fram growing toa far over such an optimum -e.g., by acquiring toa many af their competitor6. The search far suitable institutional rules -34 -seems to lead at least part ly back to the old "inhospitable" view of the U.S. antitrust legislation that bigness is a threat to efficiency. The important difference is, however, that the main threat is now seen not in monopolistic pricing, but in the damages caused to the future S-evolution.
Yet the cause of the market for corporate control is aga in strengthened, rather than weakened. Even if it is recognized that the growth of firms over a certain limit should be institutionally constrained, the presence of this market pushes the limit higher than it would otherwise be. The reason is that the possibility of takeovers -be it realized or not -exerts an extra selective pressure on firms, in addition to the pressure exerted by their product markets. For instance, consider a product market with high costs of entry and exit (fllow contestabilityfl), which relieves a large firm of much of the latter pressure. If the competition for its control is open. however, increasing the probability of a takeover with decreasing performance, the loss of efficiency and innovativeness from which the firm might suffer will like ly be alleviated. As a result, the tradeoff is made less severe: firms may be allowed to grow larger and/or the damages to the S-evolution may be kept smaller. 1. Although both evolutionary and comparative economics are the subject of a rapidly growing literature, they have little referred to each other. Even Schumpeter (1942) , who discusses both capitalism and socialism, is evolutionary only about the former; he never applies his analys is of how structures are created and destroyed to socialism. As a consequence, nirvana fallacies are frequent whenever an evolutionary economist tries to draw policy conclusions.
2. As most economists are used to study only communicable information ("data"), it may be useful to emphasize that the term "information" has a broader meaning. In the natural sciences, information is, roughly, whatever contributes to guiding choices, regardless of whether it can be communicated or not. It is in such a broad meaning that the hardware of a computer, the structure of a brain, and the genes that have guided the formation and the development of this structure can be said to contain information. It is also in such a broad meaning that economic competence is regarded here as a kind of information.
3. In one-agent decision problems, it is perhaps possible to concede to the defenders of the optimization postulate that limited EC can be viewed -36 -as an additional resouree eonstraint under whieh an agent still optimizesLe. does his best under the eonstraint of his EC, however 11mited this might be. In multi-agent organizations, however, this view is definitely of no use. The reas on is that resouree eonnstraints must be there subject to inter-agent exehanges. Because an agent cannot eonvey his EC to another agent, this is precisely what EC-eonstraints cannot be. EC must thus be regarded as intrinsie to agents' behaviors. limiting their optimization abilities. If one still wanted to speak of optimizat10n, 1t would be necessary to admit that eaeh agent has his own id106yneratie way to opt1mize, doing only h.i.e. best, more or less remote from :the. best. To admit sueh a multitude of "optimizing" behaviors is to make the optimizat10n postulate useless, indeed.
4. A recent analys is of this point in a different context will be found in Day and Pingle (1989) .
5. Kueh of this paradox is due to the problem of self-referenee. For a non-specialist in mathematieal logiet Hofstadter (1979) is probably the best and most inspiring reading.
6. The present diseussion is limited to the effects of institutional rules and regimes, assumed to be respected by the agents, while abstraeting from the means -sueh as eultural eonditioning and/or law enforeement -by whieh the agents' respect is obtained.
7. There is an instruetive formal analogy between the eouple 'regimestrueture' of an organization and the eouple 'genotype-phenotype' of a living organism. The analogy is also valid for the eorresponding types of evolution. Two types can thus be distinguished: R-evolution -e.g., as studied by Hayek (1967 Hayek ( , 1973 ) -eomparable to the evolution of genotypes, or phylogenYi and S-evolution under a given R -e.g., as studied by Sehumpeter (1942) for capitalism -eomparable to the evolution of a -37 -phenotype for a given genotype, or antageny. One limit of the analogy is, of course, that phylogeny is much slower than antogeny, whereas regimes and structures mayevolve at comparable speeds.
8. Another interesting difference is that unlike camputer components, human agents are able to learn, and thus adapt themselves to, or be conditioned by, their tasks within organizations. But this difference
should not be overestimated. Once it is clear that people are not infinitely malleable, but that all their learning is constrained by same initial ly given learning (including meta-learning) competence, this difference turns out to be smaller than it might seem. Whether individuals form organizations or vice versa, which has confused so many social scientists, can then clearly be decided. It is from individuals that their two-way relationship with organizations must begin to unfold, and it is their initially given learning competence that determines the limits to which they can be conditioned, in a feedback fashion, by their organizations. And although the two-way relationship may cause both the organizations and the individuals to evolve in a camp lex path-dependent fashion, the individuals' learning constraints are c lear ly basic.
9. Other theories which might be related to the present topic include agency theory and transaction costs theory. But these theories deal with economic organizations as they ~, or should be, and not with how such organization ~ and evolve.
10. At a more abstract leve l -in the context of what may be denoted as Revolution, rather than the presently examined S-evolution -the study of self-organization in economic literature has been pioneered by Hayek (1967 Hayek ( . 1973 , in his discussions of spontaneous social orders.
11. According to modern neurophysiology, much of human learning reposes on structural changes within brains, involving changes of interconnections -38 -among neurons. This suggests that associative actions play a more general role in the formation and evolution of multilevei structures than what the above discussion implies.
12. As Eliasson and Ysander (1983) point out, some of such errors have been made consciously for short-term political reasons. But the part due to inadequate EC, causing the real outcomes to be far from those intended and expected by the politicians, is nevertheless important.
13. With emphasis on informational obstacles, the first answer was initially stated by von Xises (1920) and Hayek (1935) and recent ly surveyed and developed by Lavoie (1985) . The motivationai obstacles were added above all by public choice theory, pioneered by Buchanan and Tollison (1972) . The second answer was first outlined by Taylor (1929) and Lange (1936-7) , and later rigorously elaborated within the framework of neoclassical economics by Arrow, Hurwicz, Xalinvaud, and Heal, among others <for a survey, see Heal 1972) . Within this framework, both kinds of obstacles are elegant ly overcome -the former by informational decentralization, and the latter by ingenious incentive-compatible arrangements (see, e.g., Loeb and Xagat 1978) .
14. That all proofs of the existence of efficient socialist planning require perfectly optimizing producers deserves emphasis. This suggests that, ironically enough, Friedman (1953) there is a wide-spread conviction that to allow economic incompetence to prosper even at the level of the most important organizational. managerial, and investment decisions was by far the greatest economic disaster caused by socialisation.
